Abstract. This paper describes new exponentiation algorithms with applications to cryptography. The proposed algorithms can be seen as m-ary generalizations of the so-called Montgomery ladder. Both left-toright and right-to-left versions are presented. Similarly to Montgomery ladder, the proposed algorithms always repeat the same instructions in the same order, without inserting dummy operations, and so offer a natural protection against certain implementation attacks. Moreover, as they are available in any radix m and in any scan direction, the proposed algorithms offer improved performance and greater flexibility.
Introduction
We consider the general problem of evaluating y = g d in a (multiplicatively written) group G with identity element 1 G , on input g ∈ G and d ∈ Z >0 . The m-ary expansion of d is given by d = 
Left-to-right algorithms
The most widely used exponentiation algorithm is the binary method (a.k.a. "square-and-multiply" algorithm) [15, Section 4.6.3] . It relies on the simple observation that
The binary method extends easily to any radix m. Let
Since
Noting that g d = g H 0 , the previous relation gives rise to an exponentiation algorithm. It can be readily programmed by scanning the m-ary representation 
Right-to-left algorithms
It is also possible to devise a similar algorithm based on a right-to-left scan of exponent d. This may be convenient when the m-ary length of d is unknown in advance. In the binary case (i.e., when m = 2), letting d = 
An accumulator A is initialized to g and squared at each iteration, so that it contains g 
Although less known than its left-to-right counterpart, as shown by Yao [29] , this method can be extended to higher radices. The basic idea remains the same.
i denotes the m-ary expansion of d, we can write
Hence, using (m−1) accumulators 
where A is initialized to g and
The so-obtained algorithm, also known as Yao's algorithm, is referred to as the right-to-left m-ary algorithm.
Implementation attacks
If not properly implemented, exponentiation algorithms may be vulnerable to side-channel attacks [17, 16] (see also [6, 19] ). Another threat against implementations of exponentiation algorithms resides in fault attacks [5] (see also [2, 11] ).
Two implementation attacks, namely SPA-type attacks and safe-error attacks, are particularly relevant in the context of exponentiation.
SPA-type attacks By observing a suitable side channel, such as the power consumption [16] or electromagnetic emanations [10, 24] , an attacker may recover secret information. For exponentiation-based cryptosystems, the goal of the attacker is to recover the value of exponent d (or a part thereof) used in the computation of g d in some group G. SPA-type attacks 1 assume that the attacker infers secret information (typically one or several bits of d) from a single execution of g d . Consider for example the square-and-multiply algorithm (that is, the left-toright m-ary algorithm with m = 2).
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Algorithm 1: Square-and-Multiply Algorithm
Each iteration comprises a 'square' and, when the bit exponent is non-zero, a subsequent 'multiply'. Since the algorithm behaves differently depending on the bit values, this may be observed from a suitable side channel. The information thus gleaned may enable the attacker to deduce one or more bits of exponent d.
One way of preventing an attacker from recovering the bit values is to execute the same instructions regardless of the value of input bit d i . Such an algorithm is said to be regular. There are several implementations of this idea. [9] . Doing so, there will be no longer conditional branchings: at each iteration, there is a square always followed by a multiply. This algorithm is known as the "square-and-multiply-always" algorithm. However, as will be explained in a moment, the resulting implementation now becomes vulnerable to safe-error attacks. -Another possibility to get a regular exponentiation is to recode exponent d in such a way that none of the digits are zero [21, 23, 27, 28] . As exemplified in [26] , this however supposes that the recoding algorithm itself is resistant to SPA-type attacks.
The above analysis is not restricted to the square-and-multiply algorithm and generalizes to the m-ary exponentiation algorithms mentioned in Sections 1.1 and 1.2. While it may argued that, for larger m, m-ary exponentiation algorithms are more regular and therefore more resistant to SPA-type attacks, these algorithms are not entirely regular since two cases are to be distinguished:
Safe-error attacks By timely inducing a fault during the execution of an instruction, an attacker may deduce whether the targeted instruction is fake: if the final result is correct then the instruction is indeed fake (or dummy); if not, the instruction is effective. This knowledge may then be used to obtain one or more bits of exponent d. Such attacks are referred to as safe-error attacks [30, 31] .
Back to the "square-and-multiply-always" algorithm, an attacker can induce a fault during a multiply. If the final result is correct then the attacker may deduce that the corresponding exponent bit is a zero (i.e., fake multiply); otherwise, the attacker may deduce that the exponent bit is a one. Safe-error attacks apply likewise to higher-radix similar m-ary methods to distinguish zero digits.
Our contributions
Using the terminology of [12] , we deal in this paper with highly regular exponentiation algorithms, that is, exponentiation algorithms that -are regular; i.e., always repeat the same instructions in the same order for any inputs; -do not insert dummy operations.
Highly regular exponentiation algorithms protect against SPA-type attacks and safe-error attacks, at the same time [14] . Examples of such algorithms include the so-called Montgomery ladder [22] and a recent powering ladder presented at CHES 2007 [12, Algorithm 1 ] . These two algorithms are depicted below.
Algorithm 2: Montgomery Ladder
Montgomery ladder and Joye's square-multiply ladder both rely on specific properties of the binary representation. In particular, it is unclear how to generalize these two algorithms to higher radices.
In this paper, we present a new method to derive highly regular exponentiation algorithms by considering a representation of d − 1 rather than that of plain exponent d. The proposed method is independent of the radix representation and of the scan direction (left-to-right or right-to-left). Interestingly, when particularized to m = 2, the method yields algorithms dual to Algorithms 3 and 2; i.e., similar algorithms but with the opposite scan direction.
Outline of the paper The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section is the core of our paper. We describe our new exponentiation algorithms. In Section 3, we present some applications thereof. Finally, we conclude in Section 4.
New Exponentiation Algorithms
As aforementioned, the goal is to evaluate
Our algorithms rely on the following proposition.
Proof. Straightforward by noting that
General case
Proposition 1 can be rewritten as 
Doing so, the evaluation of g
Algorithm 4: Regular Left-to-Right Exponentiation (General description)
Yet another way of obtaining a regular evaluation is to force the leading digit to a predetermined value by adding to d a suitable multiple of the order of g prior to the exponentiation. When applicable, this method should be preferred. Furthermore, it nicely combines with the classical DPA countermeasure consisting in adding to d a random multiple of the order of g [9] .
Final correction The final correction can be avoided by replacing d with d + 1 prior to the exponentiation, d ← d + 1. This may be useful when the memory is scarce and that the value of g is not available in memory. Note also that this step may be combined with the addition of a multiple of the order of g.
Right-to-left algorithm
We can likewise devise a right-to-left m-ary exponentiation algorithm. We follow the presentation of Section 1.2. From Equation (3), we have
The 
Algorithm 5: Regular Right-to-Left Exponentiation (General description)
Initialization In certain groups, the neutral element 1 G requires special treatment (e.g., elliptic curves given by the Weierstraß form). 3 In such groups, the multiplication of two elements A and B is typically implemented by checking whether A or B is 1 G : if this is the case, then the other element is returned; if not, the 'regular' multiplication, A · B, is evaluated and returned. As this may be observed through SPA, this can leak the first occurrence of a digit in from d prior to the exponentiation. In more detail, we replace Line 1 in Algorithm 5 with
In groups where inverses can be easily obtained (e.g., on elliptic curves), another option is to keep the value of d unchanged but to correct the result at the end 3 By special treatment, we mean that the group operation is not unified. The usual addition formulas obtained by the chord-and-tangent rule on Weierstraß elliptic curves are not valid for 1 G (i.e., the point at infinity). In contrast, in G = Z * N , neutral element 1 G = 1 does not require a special treatment. Further, in this latter case, it is easy to get SPA-resistance even if multiplication by 1 modulo N may be observed through some side channel. For example, this can be achieved by working in Z Aggregation If done naively, the aggregation step at Line 7 (i.e., the evaluation of
m+i−2 ) can be somewhat expensive. We extend a technique described in [15, p. 634 ] to suit our present needs. It requires an accumulator
, we can use the above technique to get it as A · R [1] m−2 . In our case, accumulator A is initialized to
The initialization of accumulator A (i.e., A ← A d −1 −1 ) must be performed in a regular manner. An easy way to do so is to add to d a suitable multiple of the order of g so as to force the leading digit of the resulting d to a predetermined value. An alternative method is described in Appendix A.
Final correction As for the left-to-right version, the final correction can be avoided by replacing d with d + 1. Again, this step can be combined with other steps, including the initialization step when neutral element needs a special treatment or the initialization of accumulator A in the aggregation step to force the leading digit.
Binary case
The m-ary algorithms we developed are subject to numerous variants. We present now algorithms tailored to the binary case.
In the binary case, we have m = 2 and thus, provided that
Left-to-right algorithm We can use Algorithm 4 as is, where m is set to 2 and accumulator A is initialized to g (and thus 2), we can initialize the accumulator to g d * −2 and start the loop at index − 3; this avoids dealing with neutral element 1 G .
Algorithm 6: Regular Left-to-Right Binary Exponentiation
Right-to-left algorithm A direct application of Algorithm 5 with m = 2 yields a regular right-to-left algorithm. To prevent the final correction, 4 assuming d > 1, we can initialize accumulators R [1] to g d0 and R[2] to g. We then swap the order of squaring and multiplication and start the loop at index 1.
Algorithm 7: Regular Right-to-Left Binary Exponentiation
Implementation notes In some cases, exponent d is known to be odd (this is for example the case in RSA [25] 
. Yet another strategy, provided that the order of g is odd, is to add a suitable multiple thereof to force the parity of d.
Comparison It is striking to see the resemblance between the so-obtained algorithms (i.e., Algorithms 6 and 7) and Algorithms 3 and 2, respectively. For Algorithm 7 and Montgomery ladder, this is even more apparent from the general description (i.e., when the multiply is performed prior the squaring). Actually, our algorithms when m = 2 may be considered as dual of Algorithms 3 and 2 in the sense that they execute similar instructions but scan the exponent in the opposite direction.
Further Results
The proposed exponentiation algorithms apply to any group G. In this section, we exploit some of their features to get faster yet secure implementations in certain groups. Our focus will be on the group of points of an elliptic curve over a large prime field. We note however that similar speed-ups may be available in other groups.
Composite group operations Elliptic curves over prime field F p are usually implemented using Jacobian coordinates. A point P on elliptic curve E given by
is then represented as a triple (X 1 : Y 1 : Z 1 ). Such a representation is not unique:
and Z 2 = λZ 1 for some nonzero λ ∈ F p . We refer the reader to [3, 4] for state-of-the-art formulas for point addition and point doubling in Jacobian coordinates.
In [20] , Meloni developed new point addition formulas for points with the same Z-coordinate. This technique was successfully applied in [18] to derive efficient composite point addition formulas of the form kP + Q for some k 2. The key observation is that the intermediate calculations in the computation of P + Q = (X 3 : Y 3 : Z 3 ) with Z 3 = αZ 1 involve quantities α 2 X 1 and α 3 Y 1 . Initial point P can then be viewed as (α 2 X 1 : α 3 Y 1 : Z 3 ) and the evaluation of 2P + Q can be done as (P + Q) + P where P and P + Q have the same Z-coordinate. This technique can be used recursively to obtain the value of kP + Q.
As the main loop of our regular left-to-right exponentiation algorithm (Algorithm 4) consists of evaluating such a composite operation (i.e., mA + R[1 + d i ] in additive notation), it can benefit from these improved formulas for faster computation of a point multiple on E.
Repeated powerings Building on [7] , Cohen et al. [8] suggested considering mixed coordinate systems for representing points. An interesting case for point doubling is when curve parameter a 4 is equal to −3 as it saves some multiplications (in F p ). Similar performance for an arbitrary parameter a 4 can be achieved by representing points in modified Jacobian coordinates, namely tuples of the form (X 1 :
4 . For efficiency purposes, m is usually chosen as a power of 2, say m = 2 k , in m-ary exponentiation algorithms. Raising to the power of m (resp. multiplying by scalar m, in additive notation) then amounts to computing k squarings (resp. k doublings). As in [13] , our right-to-left m-ary algorithm (Algorithm 5) repeatedly updates accumulator A as A ← A m (resp. A ← mA). The key observation here is that accumulator A is only modified in this step during the main loop (i.e., Line 5 in Algorithm 5).
As a consequence, back to elliptic curves, dP can be evaluated using mixed coordinate systems: R [ k A in additive notation) updates accumulator A as a series of k doublings in modified Jacobian coordinates. This allows one to have a fast point doubling without increasing the cost of a point addition, regardless of the value of a 4 . More precisely, the evaluation of dP can be implemented using the fastest formulas [3] for both point doubling (i.e., the same speed as when a 4 = −3 even if a 4 = −3) and point addition.
Other improvements using different mixed coordinate systems for right-toleft algorithms can be found in [1] .
Conclusion
In this paper, we developed new m-ary exponentiation algorithms. Remarkably, the proposed algorithms are highly regular: they always repeat the same (effective) instructions in the same order. This feature is useful in the implementation of exponentiation-based cryptosystems protected against SPA-type attacks and safe-error attacks. Contrary to previous regular exponentiation algorithms, our algorithms are not restricted to radix 2 but are available in any radix m. They can also accommodate a left-to-right or a right-to-left exponent scanning. Both scan directions have their own advantages. Furthermore, being generic, we note that the proposed algorithms can easily be combined with other known countermeasures to protect against other classes of attacks, including DPA-type attacks and fault attacks.
